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Overoptimism and Overborrowing
Richard M. Hynes*
Abstract: Scholars have long argued that overoptimism causes
consumers to overborrow-to borrow more than they would if they
accurately perceived the risks they face. Although this argument serves as
a central justification for policies designed to reduce consumer
borrowing, scholars have not carefully defined overoptimism. This
Article demonstrates that the term overoptimism is vague and that
different forms of overoptimism yield sharply different implications.
Paradoxically, some forms of overoptimism may actually cause
consumers to borrow less than they would if they accurately perceived the
risks they face. Therefore, generous terms of debt relief that are designed
to reduce lending to overly optimistic consumers by making it more
difficult for creditors to collect may actually reduce consumer welfare.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Bankruptcy and related laws serve as a form of insurance by
providing consumers a benefit-debt relief-when they suffer
misfortunes that makes repayment difficult or impossible.' If markets
functioned perfecdy/ we would have no need for such laws.
Consumers would simply purchase insurance against risks, such as
unemployment, that lead to financial distress. The consumer could
purchase this insurance from her creditors, either in the form of credit
insurance or in the form of explicit limitations on collections, just as
she could negotiate any other term of the credit contract with her
lender. Yet well-recognized forms of market failure, such as
contracting costs/ asymmetric information,4 externalities, 5 or
cognitive failure, 6 may prevent consumers from purchasing the

l. Numerous scholars have characterized bankruptcy as a form of insurance. See, e.g.,
Barry Adler et al., Regttlating Conmmer Bankrttptcy: A Theoretical Inqttiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
585, 587 (2000) ("As it happens, consumer bankruptcy is best justified as partial wage
insurance .... "); Charles G. Hallinan, The "'Fresh Start» Policy in Consttmer Bankrttptcy: A
Historical Inventory and an Interpretative Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 103-25 (1986)
(discussing the analogy between the bankruptcy discharge and insurance); Richard M. Hynes,
Optimal Bankrnptcy in a Non-optimal World, 44 B.C. L. REv. 1 (2002) (further exploring the
analogy between debt relief and private insurance and the moral hazards that each creates).
2. Even if markets functioned perfectly, consumers may still suffer adverse events like
unemployment or illness. However, if consumers understood the risk that these events would
occur and there were no other market failures, such as externalities, consumers would purchase
appropriate insurance against these risks ..
3. See, e.g., William R. Zame, Efficiency and the Role of Defattlt when Seettrity Markets
are Incomplete, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 1142, 1154-55 (1993) (arguing that limitations on the
enforcement of a contract may be efficient if parties are unable to write complete contracts).
Note, however, that costly contracting will not justifY mandatory terms of debt relief and thus
may be better able to explain those terms of debt relief, like homestead exemptions, that can
be somewhat waived through security interests.
4. Asymmetric information simply means that consumers know more about their
ability to repay than their creditors know. Consumers who know that they are relatively good
credit risks may agree to severe forms of debt collection in order to obtain a favorable interest
rate by distinguishing themselves from their higher-risk neighbors who will default more often
and thus find severe forms of debt collection more costly. It is possible that all consumers, even
the good credit risks, would be made better off if the government banned severe forms of debt
collection. See, e.g., Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Arm-Breaking, Conmmer Credit and Personal
Bankrttptcy, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 188 (1984).
5. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankrnptcy Law, 98 HARV. L.
REv. 1393, 1418-24 (1985).
6. Id.
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appropriate level of insurance. 7 As a consequence, the government
mandates this insurance by enacting laws that limit the ability of
creditors to collect their debts.
Laws mandating debt relief restrict the freedom of contract;
consumers are not allowed to bargain for lower interest rates or other
desirable terms by waiving their right to relief. While most scholars
now accept the need for some debt relief, 8 some argue that our
current laws may unduly raise interest rates or restrict access to credit.9
This argument has little normative appeal for those who believe that
lenders are currently too eager to lend. Perhaps in part because of this,
our nation's bankruptcy law professors overwhelmingly oppose
pending bankruptcy reforn1s designed to make consumer bankruptcy
less generous for many consumers. 10 Of course, even an overly eager
lender must find consumers willing to borrow, but scholars have long
7. For a general discussion of the market failures that may affiict consumer credit
contracts, see Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance,
4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 168 (2002).
8. However, some commentators continue to question whether the law should allow
consumers to waive some aspects of debt relief. See, e.g., Adler et al., mpra note l, at 589-607.
However, these articles typically imply that the law should allow consumers to exempt only
limited aspects of our debt-relief system. See id. (calling for reforms that would allow
consumers to waive the use of property exemptions). But the law could effectuate this reform
by simply limiting the extent of prebankruptcy planning and allowing consumers to grant
security interests in their property. Consumers are largely able to grant such interests except in
household goods and certain other property that is likely to have little resale value.
9. See, e.g., id. at 591 ("Finally, permitting debtors ex post to choose which bankruptcy
chapter to use seems questionable. Because parties can renegotiate in Chapter 7, Chapter 13
cannot increase ex post surplus. Debtors, we show, choose the chapter that minimizes the
creditors' insolvency state payoff. This worsens ex ante efficiency because interest rates rise and
bankruptcy is softer on borrowers. Permitting debtors to choose between Chapters 7 and 13
thus does not enhance ex post efficiency and reduces ex ante efficiency." (emphasis added));
Reint Gropp et al., Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand, 112 Q.J. ECON. 217
( 1997) (finding that consumers who live in states with larger property exemptions pay higher
interest rates and have a reduced access to credit); Daniel J. Villegas, Regulation of Creditor
Practices: An Evaluation of the FTCs Credit Practice Rule, 42 J. ECON. & Bus. 51 (1990)
(testing whether limitations on credit provide a net benefit to consumers and lenders). Some
scholars argue that interest rates, particularly credit card interest rates, are somehow "sticky"
and do not respond to lenders' costs. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in
the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 50 (1991). If this were true, it is possible that a
change in the terms of debt relief would have no effect on the terms of credit.
10. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?,
18 BANKR. DEV. J. l, 48 (2001) ("The vast majority of America's bankruptcy law professors
have repeatedly expressed their vehement opposition to the bankruptcy reform bills. About
l 00 professors have written Congress on four separate occasions imploring Congress not to
pass such a bill. Exactly two law professors have urged passage." (emphasis added)(citations
omitted)).
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argued that consumers suffer from a host of failings that cause them to
succumb to the siren song of easy credit. ll The prescription for this
overborrowing has remained roughly constant: provide generous debt
relief by limiting the enforcement of contracts so that lenders will
restrict consumer access to credit by an appropriate amount. 12
Defenders of the freedom of contract have traditionally rejected
these claims of consumer failings as unsupported by evidence. 13 Over
the last few decades, scholars have begun to look to psychology
literature to justifY their claims of cognitive failure in a variety of
contexts. 14 Drawing on this literature, bankruptcy scholars argue that
consumers utilize various decision heuristics that make them
systematically overly optimistic and lead them to borrow too much. 15
More frequently, scholars advance a less formal version of this claim:
consumers borrow too much because they fail to consider the
misfortunes that they will face on the trail of life. 16

11. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD ROSSER, CREDIT PERNICIOUS (1823); TERESA A. SULLIVAN,
ELIZABETH WARREN & ]AY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS 247-52
(2000). Other scholars have made similar claims in the context of secured credit. See, e.g., Julia
Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal
Government's Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 381-87 (1994)
(arguing that excessive optimism and related heuristics lead consumers to underestimate the
chance of default and foreclosure and to incur too much in home equity loans); Michael H.
Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REv. 489, 526-31
(1991) (same).
12. See, e.g., ROSSER, supra note 11, at 31-43 (arguing that courts should not enforce
consumer debts as defined by the amount borrowed); SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK,
supra note 11, at 252-61 (arguing against bankruptcy reform designed to make debt reliefless
generous); Jackson, supra note 5, at 1402 ("The availability of a limited, nonwaivable right of
discharge in bankruptcy therefore encourages creditors to police extensions of credit .... ").
13. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley, The Debtor as Victim, 87 CO&"'ELL L. REv. 1078, 1087-88
(2002) (arguing that Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook "fail to uncover evidence of substantial
consumer irrationality" that would explain why consumers incur too much debt) (reviewing
SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 11, at 22).
14. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAw & ECONOMICS 3-5
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). This literature does not uniformly support the proposition that
the government should assume that it knows more about consumers' needs than consumers
themselves. See, e.g., Jeffrey]. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97
NW. U. L. REv. 1165 (2003).
15. See Jackson, supra note 5, at 1411 (defining "heuristics" as "tools that individuals
employ in processing and assessing information"); see also Hallinan, supra note 1, at 113
(arguing that scholars have long held "strong intuitions that a substantial portion of borrowers
tend to discount excessively the risk of financial difficulties").
16. See, e.g., ROSSER, supra note 11, at 15 ("No doubt many [consumers] provide
against probable changes [in their income]; but however large we can admit the number of
these to be, there are still enough of the improvident, ignorant, and uncalculating description,
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Although scholars have challenged the claim of systematic
overoptimism, 17 this Article demurs as to the validity of this claim and
asks if, by alleging that consumers are overly optimistic, bankruptcy
scholars have stated a case for generous debt .relief. 18 In brief, the
argument that overoptimism implies a need for generous debt relief
suffers from the same criticism that has long plagued arguments in
favor of paternalistic intervention: the nature of the consumer's
irrationality (in this case overoptimism) is not sufficiently defined to
support a meaningful policy prescription. Specifically, if the overly
optimistic consumer underestimates the likelihood of moderately
adverse events, she will in fact borrow too much and the government
can improve her welfare by adopting policies that discourage
borrowing. If, however, the overly optim1st1c consumer
underestimates the likelihood of severely adverse events, events that
would cause her to default even if she borrows a reasonable amount of
debt, she will borrow too little, and the government can improve her
welfare by adopting policies that encourage borrowing. While the
former effect may dominate the latter, no one has shown this
empirically. Moreover, this argument is difficult to reconcile with
much of the scholarship favoring generous debt relief. 19
Part II describes the standard argument for why overoptimism
leads to excessive borrowing: consumers underestimate the cost of
additional debt because they underestimate how difficult it would be
to repay this additional debt if they were to suffer some misfortune.
This argument assumes that by incurring additional debt the
consumer increases the amount that she must repay after she suffers

to deserve the attention of our legislators."); Elizabeth Warren, Tbe Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND.
L.J. 1079, 1084 (1998) ("Some incur the debt with little thought about how it adds up,
perhaps like the grasshopper who never thought about the coming winter.").
17. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 13, at 1087-88; Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: Tbe Examples of Warranties and Security
Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1446 (1983) ("[T]here is no reason to think that these
[estimation] mistakes lead to a systematically optimistic bias, nor is there any way to know how
serious they are."). However, even if these mistakes do not systematically lead to an optimistic
bias, one might still argue for intervention if the consequences of overoptimism are more
severe than those of excessive pessimism.
18. This Article is similar to works by other scholars showing that assumptions of
consumer irrationality lead to ambiguous normative implications for other areas of the law. See,
e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, PROBABIL!lY ERRORS: SOME POSITIVE A."'D NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
FOR ToRT AND CONTRACT LAW (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 161, 2002).
19. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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some misfortune. Part III demonstrates that this assumption is not
always true; once the consumer defaults, the amount that she owes
will not affect the amount that she must repay. Part N demonstrates
that overoptimism, or the underestimation of the likelihood of adverse
events, can lead to either over- or underborrowing and discusses the
implications for bankruptcy reform. Part V concludes that until further
study can prove that one effect of overoptimism dominates the other,
normative arguments for generous debt relief should rely on other
forms of alleged market failure.
II. THE STANDARD OVERBORROWING ARGUMENT
Scholars on both sides of the debate over bankruptcy reform
claim that some consumers incur too much debt. Those favoring less
generous debt relief suggest that some consumers opportunistically
increase their debts once they realize that they are likely to file for
bankruptcy and therefore will not have to repay the full amount of
their loans. 2 ° For example, a consumer who realizes that bankruptcy
is inevitable may go on one last spending binge at the expense of
lenders who do not learn of the consumer's precarious financial
condition in time to adjust her credit limit. Once default becomes
inevitable, this additional spending costs the consumer nothing
because she will never have to repay the additional debt; 21 once
default becomes inevitable, additional loans amount to "free money"
from the consumer's perspective.
Those who favor more generous debt relief argue that overly
aggressive marketing causes more systematic overborrowing. 22
20. See, e.g., Michelle J. White, Economic Versus Sociological Approaches to Legal
Research: The Case of Bankruptcy, 25 L. & Soc'Y REv. 685, 694 (1991) ("Further, once it
becomes likely that an individual will file for bankruptcy, she has an incentive to borrow more,
for both her new and old debts will be discharged in bankruptcy."). However, if the lender can
prove that the consumer incurred the debt with no intent to repay, the court may exempt the
lender's debt from discharge. See, e.g., Anastas v. Am. Sav. Bank, 94 F.3d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir.
1996) ("[T]he central inquiry in determining whether there was a fraudulent representation is
whether the card holder lacked an intent to repay at the time he made the charge. We
emphasize that the representation ... is not that he has an ability to repay the debt[, but] an
intention to repay."). For a more thorough exploration of this issue, see infra note 75 and
accompanying text.
21. See infra Part III.B (explaining that once a consumer defaults, the amount of her
obligations becomes irrelevant). Of course, this assumes that a bankruptcy court will not rule
that these additional debts are nondischargeable. See cases cited infra note 75.
22. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bankruptcy: Means
Testing as a Distraction and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's Proposals as a
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Although the identity of the villains has changed, the argument that
lenders extend too much credit in pursuit of excessive profits has
endured for centuries. Today this argument is framed in terms of
credit card companies that pursue abnormally large profits, which are
in turn caused by "sticky" credit card interest rates that do not fall as
the cost of lending declines. 23 A generation ago the culprits were
consumer finance companies and installment lenders. 24 Generations
before that the culprits were retailers who sold goods on credit and
thereby charged rates that earned them an "undue profit. " 25

Figure 1: Consumer Debt
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The argument that today's consumers borrow too much has
greater force to the extent that the consumer debt burden has risen

Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 1, 7 (1998) ("It would be hard for anyone to
disagree with the proposition that Americans have too much debt .... "); Elizabeth Warren,
1he Market for Data: 1he Changing Role of Social Sciences in Shaping the Law, 2002 WIS. L.
REv. 1, 8 ("In the early 1990s, the industry went on the offensive again. Consumer credit was
highly profitable, and banks were engaged in a marketing frenzy. But as debt levels rose, so
rose the number of bankruptcies.").
23. See, e.g., SULLIVAc"l, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note ll, at 134-40; Lawrence
M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J.
249, 251 (1997) ("The profit margins of credit card issuers substantially increased beginning
in 1982, as a result of the functional deregulation of credit card interest rates .... "). Note,
however, that some scholars argue that credit card issuers do not earn abnormal profits. See,
e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, 1he Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REv. 79, 128-46 (2000).
This Article does not address the relevance of this debate.
24. See generally Vern Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension: A New Legal Concept
Aborning?, 27 ME. L. REv. 1 (1975).
25. See, e.g., ROSSER, supra note 11, at 26-28.
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significantly. However, the evidence of a nsmg consumer debt
burden is decidedly mixed. As shown in Figure 1, 26 the amount of
consumer debt has risen significantly, even as a percentage of
income. However, Figure 1 also shows that the percentage of a
consumer's income that she must dedicate to making payments on
her outstanding loans (the household debt service ratio) has not
risen as markedly in the last twenty-three years because of a decline
in interest rates and an increase in the duration of loans. 27 While the
debate over the proper measure of consumer indebtedness may have
important implications for whether consumers are being forced into
bankruptcy by crushing levels of debt, its resolution cannot answer
the question of whether consumers are borrowing too much without
defining the amount that a consumer should borrow. 28
If markets functioned perfectly/ 9 the consumer would choose
the efficient level of debt. This does not necessarily mean that
consumers would never default; given the severity of misfortune that
can befall a consumer, a world with no default would be possible
only in a world with no debt. Rather the consumer would choose the
level of debt that is best for her given the debt-relief laws that the
government has enacted. Those who argue that debt levels are
currently too high must identifY the market failure that makes
consumers incapable of making borrowing decisions for themselves.
Often the market failures are only loosely defined, but over the last
few decades scholars have begun to formalize these theories and tie
26. The household debt service ratio can be found at: Federal Reserve Board,
Household Debt-Service Burden: Release Data, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/
housedebt/default.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2003). The debt-to-income ratio is derived from
statistics found at: Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Consumer Credit Outstanding,
http://federalreserve.gov/releases/g19 /hist/cc_hist_mt.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2003);
Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, fig.LlO,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/Coded/coded.pdf (last visited Oct. 13,
2003); Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Accounts: Annual State Personal
Income, http://www.bea.gov/beajregionaljspi/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
27. For example, in calculating the debt-service burden, the Federal Reserve includes
only that portion of credit card debt likely to be included in the minimum monthly payment.
Federal Reserve Board, Household Debt-Service Burden: About the Release,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/housedebt/about.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
28. See infra pp. 111-13 for a discussion of the optimal level of borrowing. Note,
however, that no one really knows, as an objective matter, what the optimal level of borrowing
really is because the level depends on the characteristics of the individual consumer: her
expected income, tolerance of risk, etc.
29. A number of market failures can afflict consumer credit markets. For a general
discussion, see Hynes & Posner, supra note 7.
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some of these theories to the evidence of cognitive failure found by
psychologists. The fear that financial distress will harm the
consumer's family and perhaps even lead to social unrest has been
recast in terms of externalities. 30 The argument that consumers are
impulsive or do not sufficiently consider their future has been recast
in terms of hyperbolic discounting. 31 The argument that consumers
do not sufficiently consider the possibility that they will suffer some
hardship that will make repayment difficult or impossible is recast as
an argument that consumers are systematically overly optimistic and
therefore borrow too much. 32 This Article engages this last
argument.
A common version of the argument that overoptimism leads to
overborrowing is that consumers may underestimate the chance that
they will suffer some setback, such as unemployment, divorce, or
illness, that will make repayment difficult or impossible. 33 This causes
consumers to underestimate the real cost of borrowing and to
borrow more than they would if they knew the risks they face. In
such a world, debt relief may improve social welfare by forcing the
lender to absorb the loss associated with the adverse event. Because
lenders can estimate the probability of loss more accurately than
consumers, 34 lenders will ration credit by charging a higher interest
rate that more accurately reflects the cost of borrowing. 35 The higher
cost of credit will induce consumers to use less of it.
Overoptimism is sometimes offered as an explanation for the
existence of the bankruptcy discharge option, or more specifically,
the prohibition on voluntary consumer waiver of the right to seek
this discharge. 36 However, this explanation ignores a more
fundamental question. This explanation emphasizes why consumers
cannot waive debt relief, but fails to identifY why this debt relief
30. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 5, at 1418-24.
31. See generally David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J.
ECON. 443 (1997).
32. See, e.g., Jackson, sttpra note 5, at 1414.
33. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 16, at 1084.
34. This assumption is somewhat inconsistent with the argument that credit markets
may suffer from asymmetric information because the consumer knows more about the
likelihood of her default than does the lender. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 5, at 1426.
36. See, e.g., id. at 1410-14; Hallinan, supra note 1, at 113 (arguing that scholars have
long held "strong intuitions that a substantial portion of borrowers tend to discount
excessively the risk of financial difficulties").
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must take the form of a bankruptcy discharge. 37 This distinction is
important because even if Congress were to repeal the bankruptcy
code, a host of federal and state laws would still allow consumers to
keep some of their assets and income after default. 38 Of course, these
laws could be repealed or made waivable as well, but no one has
made this argument in the political arena. For that matter, no one
has seriously called for repeal of the Bankruptcy Code in over a
century. 39 Over the last few years, Congress has considered various
versions of legislation designed to make bankruptcy less generous,
and limit the ability of a small number40 of high-income consumers
to obtain an immediate discharge of their debts. 41 In short, the
debate over bankruptcy reform focuses on how generous debt relief
should be rather than on whether we need it at all.
Advocates of generous debt relief sometimes argue that recent
efforts designed to make consumer bankruptcy less generous will
exacerbate the over borrowing problem, as illustrated in Figure 2A. 42
A reduction in the generosity of debt relief will substantially increase
the supply of credit (from S to S') because lenders believe that they
are more likely to be repaid. 43 However, this change in the law will
not have an appreciable effect on the demand for credit (demand for

37. See Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy? (Feb. 10, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (demonstrating that society could mimic bankruptcy's "fresh
start" through slight modifications to existing federal and state nonbankruptcy limitations on
debt collection).
38. See infra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
39. During the 19th century, Congress enacted and then repealed three different
bankruptcy acts. Congress repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 in 1803, 2 Stat. 248 (1803),
the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 in 1843, Act of Mar. 3, 1843, 5 Stat. 614 (1843), and the
Bankruptcy Act of 1867 in 1878, Act of June 7, 1878, 20 Stat. 99 (1878). For a history of
bankruptcy in the United States, see Charles Jordan Tabb, Ihe History of the Bankruptcy Laws
in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5 (1995).
40. See, e.g., Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer
Bankruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means· Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. lNST.
L. REV. 27, 31 (1999) (finding that proposed legislation would prevent only 3.6% of current
Chapter 7 debtors from receiving an immediate discharge). Some scholars strongly criticize the
methodology used by Culhane & White, supra, but even these scholars acknowledge that the
reforms are unlikely to bar more than 10-15% of currently bankrupt debtors from filing under
Chapter 7. See, e.g., Judge Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing,
1999 BYU L. REv. 177, 188-91.
41. For a highly critical overview of this legislation, see Tabb, supra note 10, at
(suggesting that consumer bankruptcy may "be on death row").
42. See, e.g., Ausubel, supra note 23, at 268-69.
43. Id.
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credit will only move from D to D') because consumers
underestimate the probability that they will use debt relief and thus
underestimate the importance of the change in this term of the credit
contract. 44 As a result, the total amount of borrowing increases from
B to B'.
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Figure 2A illustrates a positive claim (less generous debt relief
will lead to more borrowing) used to support the normative claim
that debt-relief laws should remain generous. However, the link
between the positive analysis and the normative conclusion rests on
the assumption that current levels of borrowing are too high (or at
least not too low), and therefore further increases in borrowing
would reduce consumer welfare.
Assume, for the sake of argument, that if consumers were
rational, the demand for credit would be given by D* (Figure 2B),
and therefore the optimal level of borrowing is given by B*>B.
Because less generous debt relief causes overly optimistic consumers
to borrow an amount closer to the optimal level of borrowing,
B*>B'>B, it is possible that less generous debt relief improves social
welfare, though there are offsetting effects. Though less generous
debt relief moves the level of borrowing closer to the optimal level of

44. Id. Indeed, consumers may not even bother to learn of changes in the law because
they are confident that the law will not apply to them. Id. at 269.
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borrowing, it does so at the cost of reducing the insurance the
consumer receives when she defaults. Therefore, the appropriate
level of debt relief will result in some level of borrowing that is
slightly less than the optimal amount of borrowing, or the amount of
debt that consumers would incur if they understood the
government's debt-relief policy and were fully rational.
Of course, one cannot just assume that the optimal level of debt
would equal B", and, as discussed above, there are a host of reasons
why consumers may in fact borrow too much, such that the optimal
level of borrowing is actually less than B-' or even B. 45 However, this
Article demonstrates a rather counter-intuitive result. If the only
market failure present is that consumers underestimate the likelihood
of adverse events, it is entirely possible that they will borrow too
little, not too much. 46
Ill. AFTER DEFAULT, THE CONSUMER WHO OWES
MORE NEED NOT PAY MORE

The standard overborrowing argument is that consumers
underestimate the cost of repaying an additional dollar of debt
because they underestimate the chance that they will have to repay
this additional debt after they have suffered some misfortune that
leaves them relatively impoverished. However, an additional dollar of
debt may not increase the total amount that the consumer must
repay after suffering this misfortune. This Article assumes that once a
consumer decides to default, the amount that of repayment does not
increase with the total amount owed to unsecured creditors-the
required repayment depends only on the consumer's remaining
assets and income. Part liLA demonstrates that this assumption is
generally valid in the nonbankruptcy context, and Part III.B
illustrates that it is generally valid in the bankruptcy context as well. 47

45. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
46. See infra Part IV and the Appendix. As more fully explained below, a consumer who
underestimates severely adverse events that would cause her to default even if she borrowed a
reasonable amount of debt will overestimate the probability of repayment and hence
overestimate the cost of borrowing.
47. Of course, the consumer's total obligations do place a ceiling on her repayment in
that no court would require her to repay more than the amount she owes. However, in the
United States, bankrupt consumers rarely, if ever, repay all of their lenders in full. In fact,
general unsecured creditors receive no payments in about 95% of all Chapter 7 bankruptcy
cases. See Executive Office for United States Trustees, United States Trustee Program:
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A. Nonbankruptcy Debtor-Creditor Law

Although consumer bankruptcy has dominated the recent
consumer finance scholarship, most consumers who default on their
loans probably do not file for bankruptcy. 48 Rather, they make use of
an informal bankruptcy system49 created by federal and state
limitations on nonbankruptcy collections. Creditors will typically
begin the collections process by writing or calling the consumer to
ask for payment, 50 and may simply abandon their efforts if these
prove unsuccessful. Some creditors will take the additional step of
seeking a court judgment to either attach assets or garnish wages.
Federal and state laws place limits on a creditor's ability to
garnish a consumer's wages. Federal law allows general creditors to
garnish no more than 25% of the consumer's take-home earnings. 5 1
The aggregate amount of a consumer's obligations may affect how
much a particular creditor will receive, but will have no bearing on
the total amount that all creditors can garnish, and thus no effect on
the total amount that the consumer must repay. 52 Although state
Preliminary Report on Chapter 7 Asset Cases 1994 to 2000, at 7 (2001) (on file with author)
(uHistorically, the vast majority (about 95 to 97 percent) of chapter 7 cases yield no assets.").
In addition, if the consumer does repay in full, there has been no real default, at least in the
economic sense, because the creditor has lost nothing.
48. See, e.g., Am. Bankers Ass'n, 1997 Installment Credit Report, at 109 (9th ed. 1997)
(reporting that approximately 70% of all bank consumer credit losses occur outside of
bankruptcy). Of course, this is a percentage of the dollar amount of outstanding obligations
rather than individuals, and it is possible that some individuals file for bankruptcy long after
their creditors have accounted for their debts as unlikely to be repaid. However, this figure
clearly implies that a large number of consumers who refuse to repay their loans do not file for
bankruptcy.
49. See AMfu"'DA E. DAWSEY & LAWRENCE M. AUSUBEL, INFORMAL BANKRUPTCY (Soc.
Sci. Research Network, Working Paper 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.comjsol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=332161 (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
50. Collection efforts sometimes border on harassment or intimidation, though both
federal and state laws provide consumers with some protection. See Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 16921692o); 2 HOWARD]. ALPERIN & ROLAND F. CHASE, CONSUMER LAW: SALES PRACTICES
AND CREDIT REGULATION § 633, at 356 (1986) (describing state laws). Some believe that
these laws are currently insufficient, but that is outside the scope of this analysis.
51. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000) (restricting garnishment
in favor of general creditors to no more than the lesser of 25% of the consumer's "disposable
earnings" or the amount by which her disposable income exceeds thirty times the federal
minimum wage). "Disposable earnings" is defined in this context to mean earnings less any
amount required by law to be withheld. Id. § 1672(b).
52. Of course the aggregate amount of the consumer's debt may affect how long her
wages are garnished because the consumer's wages will be used to pay off the first priority
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garnishment laws sometimes provide further protection of the
consumer's future income, 53 no state statute instructs a judge to
consider the aggregate amount of the consumer's obligations, 54 and
it is highly unlikely that judges consider this factor in the more openended analysis called for by some statutes. 55
Just as limitations on garnishment allow the consumer to retain
some of her income after default, state property exemptions allow
her to retain some of her assets as well. Like limitations on
garnishment, property exemptions do not consider the aggregate
amount of the consumer's obligations. Property exemptions allow
the consumer to exempt certain types of assets, such as home equity,
clothing, or insurance policies, from attachment by judgment
creditors. These exemptions vary greatly from state to state;
sometimes they provide explicit limits on the amount of wealth the
consumer may retain, and sometimes they do not. 56 No state statute,
however, instructs a court to consider the consumer's aggregate
obligations when determining the amount of property the consumer
may exempt. 57

creditor in full before being applied to satisfY the judgments of other creditors. However, if a
creditor is ultimately repaid in full, there has been no default in an economic sense, because the
creditor has lost nothing.
53. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.00l(b)(l) (Vernon 2000) (prohibiting
garnishment of earned but unpaid wages).
54. For a compilation of state garnishment laws, see BARBARA S. MOORE, THE
COMPLETE GUIDE TO GARNISHMENT: STATE & FEDERAL LAws, FORMS A..'<D PRACTICAL
GUIDA..'<CE 28--61 (2002).
55. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § l3-54-l04(3)(b)(III) (1999) (authorizing the judge
to provide for garnishment in an amount less than such maximum amounts when a debtor is
totally and permanently disabled and establishes that at least 75% of his income comes from
disability income or benefits).
56. For example, Texas allows a consumer to exempt her home equity as long as her
home is on a lot of less than ten acres in a town, village, or city or on a lot less than one
hundred acres (200 for a family) elsewhere. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001-.002
(Vernon 2000). By contrast, a family of four in Virginia may only protect $11,000 in home
equity. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-4 (Michie 2002); see also In re Snellings, 10 B.R. 949 (Bankr.
W.O. Va. 1981) (allowing husband and wife to each claim a $5,000 exemption). That is, of
course, unless the home is held in the form of tenancy by the entirety and none of the married
couple's obligations are owed jointly. See Rogers v. Rogers, 512 S.E.2d 821 (Va. 1999)
(refusing to allow creditors to foreclose on real estate held in the form of tenancy by the
entirety even though creditors obtained judgments against each spouse individually); Price v.
Harris (In re Harris), 155 B.R. 948 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993) (allowing the sale of home for the
benefit of the creditors of both spouses).
57. For a compilation of state property exemptions, see 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 'l[
4003 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. 2003).
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The discussion thus far deals with unsecured credit. Of course,
the amount of the consumer's secured credit may limit the property
she can retain because, with limited exceptions, 58 property
exemptions do not prevent a secured creditor from seizing her
collateral. As a result, this Article does not question the link between
overoptimism and overborrowing when made in the context of
secured loans such as home mortgage loans. 59

B. Bankruptcy Law
For the most part, bankruptcy law also refuses to consider
amount of the consumer's total obligations when setting
required repayment. About 70% of consumer bankruptcy filings
Chapter 7 filings, 60 and virtually all other consumers who file
bankruptcy choose Chapter 13. 61

the
her
are
for

1. Chapter 7 bankruptcy
Chapter 7 grants the consumer a complete discharge of her
loans, 62 thereby freeing all of her future income from attachment.
Chapter 7 also allows the consumer to exempt roughly the same
property that she would be able to exempt outside of bankruptcy
under applicable state law. 63 Therefore, the total amount the

58. For example, if the consumer files for bankruptcy, she may be able to avoid some
security interests in items such as household goods. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (2000) (allowing
consumers to avoid a lien on certain furnishings, goods, clothing, etc., held for personal use,
provided that the security interest is not securing the purchase money).
59. See, e.g., Forrester, supra note 11, at 381-87 (arguing that excessive optimism and
related heuristics lead consumers to underestimate the chance of default and foreclosure and to
incur too much debt in home equity loans); Schill, supra note 11, at 526-30 (arguing that
similar heuristics lead consumers to demand insufficient protections after underestimating the
chance of default and foreclosure).
60. See ABI World, Non-business Bankruptcy Filings by Chapter, 1990-2003, per
Quarter, http:/ jwww.abiworld.org/stats/1990nonbuschapter.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2004)
[hereinafter Non-business Bankruptcy Filings].
61. Consumers can also file under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Toibb v.
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991). However, in 2001, less than six out of ten thousand
nonbusiness filings were Chapter 11 filings (789 out of 1,451 ,789). See Non-business
Bankruptcy Filings, supra note 60.
62. Some debts, such as tax obligations or debts resulting from willful and malicious
injury, are excepted from the Chapter 7 discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000).
63. The consumer is always allowed to use the same exemptions that were available to
her in a state collections proceeding, and she may be able to use certain federal, bankruptcyonly exemptions as well. See l l U.S.C. § 522 (2000). However, the bankruptcy code also gives
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consumer owes does not affect how much, if anything, she must
repay in Chapter 7.
Under existing case law, the total amount of the consumer's
obligations may affect her ability to choose Chapter 7 in the first
place. That is, some courts are more likely to dismiss a consumer's
filing as a "substantial abuse" of the Bankruptcy Code 64 if the
consumer can repay her debts in full 65 or in significant part66 over
three years. 67 If courts focus on the percentage of debts repaid
instead of the value repaid, a consumer who borrows more may be
more likely to quality for Chapter 7 relief because it is less likely that
she will be able to repay a significant percentage of her debt.
Although this interpretation of substantial abuse is consistent with
the assumption that an increase in debt does not increase the
required repayment after default, it adds a technical complication
that could provide an additional argument for why overoptimism
could lead a consumer to borrow too little. 68

states the right to deny their consumers the use of these federal, bankruptcy-only exemptions,
and the vast majority of states have done so. See, e.g., Richard M. Hynes, An up Malani & Eric
A. Posner, The Political Economy of Property Exemption LaJVs, 47 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming
2004) (listing the year in which each state enacted legislation to deny their consumers the right
to use the federal, bankruptcy-only exemptions). Yet in doing so, some states have enacted
property exemptions that apply only in bankruptcy. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE §§
703.130, .140 (West 2001).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000).
65. See, e.g., Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 915 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[A]
finding that a debtor is able to pay his debts, standing alone, supports a conclusion of
substantial abuse."); First USA v. Lamanna (In re Lamanna), 153 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998)
(holding that a debtor's ability to repay her debts is the most important consideration in the
substantial abuse analysis); see also, 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 'l[ 707.04[ 4] (Alan N. Resnick
& Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. 2003) [hereinafter 6 COLLIER].
66. See, e.g., Fonder v. United States, 974 F.2d 996, 1000 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that
petitioner was able to repay 89% of unsecured debts over thirty-six months and repay in full
over sixty months); In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that petitioner
was able to repay over two-thirds of unsecured debts over thirty-six months and repay in full
over sixty months); In reWoodward, 265 B.R. 179, 195 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2001) (dismissing
Chapter 7 petition because debtor was able to repay 37.2% of unsecured debts over thirty-six
months and 62% of that debt over sixty months). See also 6 COLLIER, supra note 65, 'l[ 707.04

[4].
67. Courts typically evaluate the ability to repay over a three-to-five-year period because
a debtor in Chapter 13 must typically propose a plan that will last for three years, though a
court can order a five-year plan for cause. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2000).
68. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
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2. Chapter 13 bankruptcy
The other major form of consumer bankruptcy, Chapter 13,
requires that a consumer repay her creditors over a period of three to
five years pursuant to a plan proposed by the consumer and approved
by the bankruptcy court. There are two major tests for determining
how much the consumer must promise to repay in her Chapter 13
plan, 69 and neither test explicitly considers the aggregate amount of
her debt.
The best-interests-of-the-creditors test effectively requires that a
consumer's creditors receive at least as much in Chapter 13 as they
would have received in Chapter 7. 70 As outlined above, the total
amount of the consumer's obligations does not affect her aggregate
repayment in Chapter 7 and therefore does not affect how much she
must repay pursuant to the best-interests-of-the-creditors test.
The other major repayment test of Chapter 13, the disposableincome test, requires that the consumer promise to repay an amount
equal to her projected income over three years, less some courtdetermined allowance for "reasonably necessary expenses. " 71 Unless
the aggregate amount of the consumer's obligations somehow has an
effect on her income or her "reasonably necessary expenses," it will
have no effect on her "projected disposable income" or her required
repayment.
Scholars allege that the practice of bankruptcy diverges from the
above theory and that in some jurisdictions, bankruptcy judges insist
that plans propose the repayment of a "floor percentage," or a
minimum percentage of total outstanding debts. 72 To the extent that
this is true, consumers who owe more may have to pay more after

69. These tests refer to how much the consumer must pay her unsecured creditors. Her
secured creditors may object if they will not receive an amount equal to the value of their
collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (2000).
70. !d.§ 1325(a)(4).
71. !d.§ 1325(b).
72. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consttmer Bankrttptcy: One Code, Many
Cttltttres, 67 AM. BA.c"-!KR. L.J. 501, 532 (1993) ("The reality is that chapter 13 trustees and
judges in the four cities (studied] effectively deter 0% plans and keep most plans above a floor
percent that is known to local practitioners."). This impression is shared by those who advise
consumers on how to file for bankruptcy. See, e.g., ROBIN LEONARD, CHAPTER 13
BANKRUPTCY: REPAY YOUR DEBTS, at 7/2 (3rd ed. 1998) ("In some courts, the judge will
not approve your plan unless you propose paying your unsecured creditors a significant portion
of what you owe them, usually at least 70%."). "The lawyers then respond by rarely or never
submitting plans with less than the specified percentage." Braucher, sttpra, at 532.
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default. However, this complication is not fatal to this analysis for
several reasons. First, it is unclear how frequently courts require a
floor percentage. Second, these floor percentages appear to serve as a
screening device, and courts do confirm plans that promise less than
the floor percentage if the consumer can establish an inability to pay
more. 73 Third, even if a consumer is unable to file under Chapter 13,
she can still make use of non bankruptcy debt-relieflaws, and she may
be able to file under Chapter 7.
Finally, one might object to the claim that additional borrowing
is costless as long as the consumer will default before repaying
because a court may deny the discharge of these debts on the theory
that the debtor never intended to repay the debts, and thus they
were incurred by fraud. 74 However, most courts require the creditor
to do more than merely demonstrate that the debtor could not have
reasonably expected to repay her debts; the creditor must also show
that the debtor did not subjectively believe that she could repay the
debts. 75 Here, the consumer's overoptimism may protect her. As
long as the consumer's overoptimism is honest (but unreasonable)
she will still receive a discharge of her additional debts? 6

73. See, eg., Braucher, supra note 72, at 532.
74. See ll U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2000) (making a debt nondischargeable if it is obtained
through fraud or false pretenses). This provision is often used by credit card issuers who claim
that the debtor makes an implied representation of her intent to repay her loan when she uses
her credit card. AT&T Universal Card Sen•s. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391, 425
(5th Cir. 2001) (holding that with each use of a credit card, a debtor implied her intent to
repay the loan); Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Hashemi (In re Hashemi), 104 F.3d
1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that with each use of a credit card, a debtor implied her
intent to repay the loan). Numerous articles address the ability of credit card issuers to use §
523 to make their loans nondischargeable. See, eg., Richard H. Gibson, Credit Card
Dischargeability: Two Cheers for the Common Law and Some Modest Proposals for Legislative
Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 129 (2000).
75. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 53 B.R. 724, 732
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Blackburn (In re Blackburn), 68 B.R.
870, 877 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987).
76. See Ga. Bank & Trust Co. v. McKinney (In re McKinney), 18 B.R. 607 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1982); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 523.08(l](d] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 15th ed. 2003) ( "A debtor's honest belief that a debt would be repaid in the
future, even if in hindsight found to have been very unrealistic, negates any fraudulent
intent.").
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IV. THE AMBIGUOUS IMPLICATIONS OF OVEROPTIMISM

This Article argues principally that overoptimism may lead to
underborrowing as well as overborrowing. The reasons for this can
be readily explained with verbal-analytic arguments and a simple
numerical example; those who desire a more formal treatment
should consult the Appendix. Part IV argues that an overly
optimistic consumer may underestimate two different types of
adverse events: severely adverse events that would have caused her to
default even if she had borrowed a reasonable amount and more
moderately adverse events that would only cause default if she
borrowed too much. Part IV.A will show that if the consumer
underestimates the likelihood of severely adverse events that would
cause her to default even if she borrowed a reasonable amount, she
will likely borrow too little because she will overestimate the
likelihood that she will have to repay her loan and thus overestimate
her average repayment. By contrast, Part IV.B will show that if she
underestimates the likelihood of moderately adverse events she will
borrow too much because she will underestimate the likelihood that
she will be forced to repay her debts when it is difficult for her to do
so. Part IV.C looks to the literature to determine whether one form
of overoptimism is likely to dominate the other, and Part IV.D
examines the implications for bankruptcy policy.
To understand the distinction between severely adverse events
and moderately adverse events, imagine a consumer who borrows
some amount today and promises to repay tomorrow out of her
disposable income. Assume further that the consumer faces a variety
of risks such as unemployment and illness so that tomorrow's
disposable income will be anywhere between $0 and $100,000.
Assume that the consumer's debt level does not affect her future
income.
For now, assume that the consumer knows the distribution of
values that her future disposable income can take as well as the
system of debt relief that the government has put in place. This does
not mean that the consumer knows exactly how much money she
will have tomorrow, only that she does not underestimate any
possible value that this income can take. If there is no other form of
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market failure/ 7 the consumer will borrow an efficient amount that
reflects the true cost of borrowing. Assume that this amount would
require her to repay $30,000 tomorrow. Although this value is
chosen arbitrarily, its precise amount is not critical for the analysis
that follows. Rather, the analysis will focus on the consumer's
incentive to borrow an additional dollar on top of the amount that
she would have borrowed if she could accurately assess the risks she
faces.
For the sake of simplicity, assume that society enacts a system of
debt relief that allows a consumer to exempt $20,000 from her
creditors if she defaults on her loan. 78 Assume further that the
consumer defaults whenever she can increase her consumption by
doing so, that is, whenever the exemption exceeds the difference
between her disposable income and the amount that she must
repay. 79 If the consumer borrowed the efficient amount initially, she
will default whenever her disposable income falls below $50,000
when repayment is required because by doing so she can consume
$20,000. This is more than she could have consumed if she repaid
her debts in full.
Figure 3A plots the consumer's consumption tomorrow against
her disposable income tomorrow; if the consumer owed nothing and
she earned the maximum of $100,000 she would consume
$100,000. However, we have assumed that the consumer is asked to
make a $30,000 repayment so that if she earned $100,000 she can
consume only $70,000. If the consumer's disposable income is
between $0 and $20,000, she will default and then use the $20,000
exemption to consume what little amount that she has. If she earns
between $20,000 and $50,000 she will always consume $20,000
because she will default and make full use of the $20,000 exemption.

77. For example, the consumer may fail to consider the externalities of borrowing or
may act impulsively. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
78. The results of this Article do not depend on this specific assumption, but rather on
the assumption that the law will not require the defaulting consumer to repay more if she has
borrowed more. A general proof of this result is presented in the Appendix.
79. As discussed above, this assumption may not hold if courts deny a consumer access
to Chapter 7 if she is able to repay some percentage of her debt. See mpra text accompanying
note 68. If this is the case, the consumer's required repayment may vary with her debt burden.
Paradoxically, her required repayment may decline as her debt burden increases. This may
provide yet another reason why the consumer may borrow too little if she underestimates the
probability of adverse events; she may underestimate the chance that an additional dollar of
debt may grant her access to Chapter 7. This issue is treated more formally in the Appendix.
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If she earns more than $50,000 she will repay the loan in full and
consume whatever disposable income she has left.
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Figure 3A
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Tomorrow's Disposable
Income
A. Overoptimism that Cannot Lead to Overborrowing
A consumer who underestimates the likelihood of severely
adverse events that would cause her to default even if she borrowed a
reasonable amount will borrow too little, not too much. The
consumer will overborrow if she underestimates the likely cost of
repaying her loans. To illustrate such overborrowing, assume that the
consumer in Figure 3A borrows more today and therefore must
promise to repay an additional $10,000 on top of the $30,000 that
she would have had to promise to repay if she borrowed only the
efficient amount. 80 The dashed line in Figure 3B presents the
consumer's consumption tomorrow if she does this.
80. The amount of the extra borrowing will be somewhat less than $10,000 because the
full repayment in the second period includes interest.
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Figure 3B
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Tomorrow's Disposable
Income
As observed above, once the consumer chooses to default, the
aggregate amount of her debt will not affect the amount that she
must repay; 81 even if the consumer promised to repay an additional
$10,000, she will consume the same $20,000 of exempt income
when she suffers a severely adverse event that leaves her with less
than $50,000 because she would have defaulted whether or not she
borrowed this additional amount. The consumer cannot possibly
underestimate the cost the additional debt imposes on her when
severely adverse events occur (when her disposable income falls
below $50,000) because this additional debt costs nothing when
these events occur. The additional debt does not increase her
repayment when she suffers a severely adverse event. As shown by
the dashed line in Figure 3B, it is only when she does not suffer this
severely adverse event (when her disposable income exceeds
$50,000) that the additional dollar of debt will reduce her
consumption at all. Therefore, by underestimating the likelihood of a
81. See supra Part III.
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severely adverse event, or in other words, by overestimating the
likelihood that this adverse event will not occur, the consumer
overestimates the likelihood of repayment, and overestimates the
average amount that she will actually repay. This will cause her to
borrow too little, not too much, because she perceives the interest
rate to be higher than it really is. Thus, she fails to continue
borrowing until the value to her of an additional dollar of
consumption in the first period is equal to the value to her of the
consumption that she must forego in the second period if she
borrows the additional dollar.
The explanation for why the underestimation of severely adverse
events may lead to underborrowing is similar to the standard
explanation for why opportunistic consumers borrow on the eve of
default. 82 If an opportunistic consumer knows for certain that she will
default tomorrow, borrowing and consuming more today costs
nothing because the additional loan will never be repaid. For overly
optimistic consumers, borrowing and consuming today seems costly
because they believe (wrongly) that they will not default tomorrow.
Thus, overly optimistic consumers overestimate how much, on
average, they will have to repay.
This effect can also be explained as a standard application of the
impact that an increase in price has on the consumption of a good.
By overestimating the average repayment, the consumer
overestimates the effective interest rate or price of borrowing, at least
in nominal terms. When the price of a good goes up, consumers
tend to substitute away from this good (this is called the
"substitution effect");83 when the perceived price of borrowing
increases due to an overestimation of the likelihood of repayment,
the consumer will borrow less. One might think that this
overoptimism would cause the consumer to feel more wealthy and
thus to borrow more; one might think that there would be an
"income effect." 84 However, no income effect results when the

82. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Though one might think it dishonest to
borrow when one knows that she will not repay, it is not necessarily dishonest to borrow when
one knows that there is some chance that he will not repay. If so, virtually all borrowing would
be dishonest.
83. See, e.g., RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., MICROECONOMICS 128-32 (9th ed. 1990).
84. I d. (explaining that the income effect, sometimes called a wealth effect, refers to the
fact that as the individual's wealth changes her demand for a particular good will change and
will typically increase).
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consumer only underestimates severely adverse events because the
consumer is not asked to repay any of the marginal dollar borrowed
when these events occur. As discussed below, the income effect may
play an important role when the consumer experiences more
moderately adverse events.
Perhaps an even more basic example will illustrate the possibility
of underborrowing. Assume that the consumer will have a fifty
percent chance of receiving $100,000 in income tomorrow and a
fifty percent chance of receiving nothing. Assume further that the
consumer is indifferent between consuming money today and
consuming it tomorrow, and that for each dollar she consumes up to
$50,000, she receives one unit of happiness. Additionally, she
receives only 0.8 units of happiness for each dollar that she consumes
beyond $50,000, because she will use her first $50,000 to meet her
most basic needs, and any additional dollar will be spent on items
that are of less importance to her. 85 If the consumer applies for a
$50,000 loan, the lender will demand that she promise to repay
$100,000 because the lender will receive this payment only fifty
percent of the time. If the consumer is overly optimistic and believes
that she will earn $100,000 with certainty, she will not take the loan.
If she borrows this amount, she will have 50,000 units of happiness
today; but if she does not borrow, she believes that she will have
90,000 units of happiness tomorrow from consuming the full
$100,000. 86 In fact, however, she will receive the 90,000 units of
happiness only half of the time and thus, on average, she will have
only 45,000 units of happiness. If she knew the true probability of
hardship, she would have taken the loan.
While the above examples do not include financial or emotional
costs associated with bankruptcy or default, such costs would not
change the prediction that the underestimation of severely adverse
events cannot lead to overborrowing. 87 By definition, the consumer

85. Economists typically assume that the incremental happiness, or marginal utility, that
an individual derives from an additional dollar of consumption falls as the consumer consumes
more. See, eg., id. at 151.
86. The first $50,000 would provide her with 50,000 units of happiness. The next
$50,000 would provide her with 40,000 units of happiness ($50,000 x 0.8).
87. These emotional costs may affect the likelihood of a severely adverse event by
changing the optimal level of debt. That is, if default itself causes severe financial and
emotional harm to the consumer, she will wish to minimize the likelihood of this default and
may do so by borrowing less.
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will default when a severely adverse event occurs even if she borrows
the efficient amount, and therefore the consumer will incur the costs
of default regardless of whether she borrows another dollar. The
costs would have to increase as the consumer becomes more
indebted in order to alter the analysis. Although possible, 88 such an
assumption is far less compelling than a statement that consumers
face substantial out of pocket expenses, emotional pain, and damage
to their credit reputations as a result of default.
Finally, this explanation for why the underestimation of adverse
events may lead to underborrowing does not depend on any strong
assumptions about the degree of the consumer's risk aversion or the
form of debt relief. It does depend, however, on the precise nature of
the risk that the consumer underestimates. By altering the assumptions
about the nature of the consumer's overoptimism, it is possible to
reach the standard result that overoptimism leads to overborrowing.

B. Overoptimism that Can Lead to Overborrowing
A consumer who underestimates the likelihood of some adverse
events may underestimate the cost of borrowing and thus borrow
too much. For this to be the case, the consumer must underestimate
the likelihood of more moderately adverse events, such as short-term
unemployment, that would not have caused her to default had she
borrowed the efficient amount; she must underestimate the
likelihood of adverse events that still leave her with an income in
excess of $50,000. This underestimation will not cause her to
underestimate the dollar amount that she will repay tomorrow; thus
there will be no substitution effect. However, this underestimation
may further cause her to underestimate the likelihood that an adverse
event will reduce her disposable income tomorrow, thus making it
more costly, in terms of lost happiness, to repay an extra dollar of
debt; the result will be an income effect. For example, if the
consumer earns $100,000 a year, an additional $10,000 of debt may
mean that she must reduce her entertainment budget or plan a less
expensive vacation. If she earns just $60,000 a year, an additional
$10,000 of debt may mean that she cannot afford a vacation at all or
must cut some other expense that is much more important to her.
88. One may, for example, argue that the consumer experiences a much greater sense of
failure when she defaults on a $40,000 obligation than when she defaults on a $20,000
obligation.
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If consumers underestimate the likelihood that their income will
fall in some range, they must overestimate the likelihood that their
income will fall in some other range. If one posits that consumers
underestimate the likelihood of moderately adverse events that would
not have caused a default at the efficient level of debt and
correspondingly overestimate the likelihood of severely adverse events
that would have caused a default even at this amount, then the
underestimation will unambiguously lead to overborrowing.
However, under these assumptions the underestimation hypothesis is
really a story of excessive pessimism, not overoptimism, and is just a
special case of the effect described in the previous section.

lOOK

Figure 3C
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Tomorrow's Disposable
Income
Therefore, if one is to argue that overoptimism leads to
overborrowing, one must argue, first, that consumers underestimate
the probability of moderately adverse events that would not have led
to default had the consumer borrowed a reasonable amount, and,
second, that they overestimate the likelihood that they will be very
well-off. For example, as shown in Figure 3C, one might choose
some arbitrary value, say $70,000, and assume that the consumer
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underestimates the likelihood of each event that would leave her
with less than $70,000 and overestimates the likelihood of each
event that will leave her with more than $70,000.
Even this assumption is not enough to ensure that overoptimism
will lead to overborrowing because it is possible that the substitution
effect (which tends to cause the consumer to borrow too little) will
offset the income effect (which tends to cause the consumer to
borrow too much). Assume instead that consumers underestimate
only the likelihood of moderately adverse events, events that would
not have caused them to default had they borrowed the efficient
amount but that do leave them with disposable income of less than
$70,000. That is, consumers underestimate the likelihood of events
that leave them with an income between $50,000 and $70,000, and
consumers correctly estimate the likelihood of severely adverse events
that leave them with less than $50,000. Because consumers
underestimate only moderately adverse events, they correctly
estimate the probability of repayment had they borrowed the
efficient amount and promised to repay $30,000. Thus, because they
do not underestimate the expected value of the amount that they
must repay, there is no substitution effect. However, consumers
think that it is disproportionately likely that they will be asked to
repay when they are wealthy and can easily afford to repay the debt;
they perceive themselves to be wealthier than they really are and thus
the income effect will cause them to borrow more. This matches the
common intuition that overly optimistic consumers underestimate
the probability that they will suffer some event that will make
repayment difficult and painful.
It follows that if one takes an expansive view of overoptimism
and assumes that consumers underestimate the likelihood of severely
adverse events (events that would cause default at the efficient level
of borrowing) as well as moderately adverse events (events that
would not cause a default at the efficient level of borrowing but still
leave the consumer relatively poor), the results become theoretically
ambiguous. The underestimation of severely adverse events will
cause underborrowing because of the substitution effect; this form of
overoptimism causes the consumer to overestimate the required
repayment for a given amount of borrowing. The underestimation of
moderately adverse events will cause overborrowing because of the
income effect; this form of overoptimism causes the consumer to
perceive the cost of repaying a given amount as less painful than it
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really is. Which effect will dominate is an empirical matter that will
depend on the precise nature of the overoptimism, the optimal level
of debt, the degree of the consumer's risk aversion, and the debtrelief laws that society has adopted.

C. Competing Theories of Optimism
To reach the conclusion that overoptimism leads consumers to
borrow too much, one must do more than merely assume that
consumers are overly optimistic. Rather, one must either allege other
forms of market failure or carefully specify the nature of this
overoptimism. That is, are consumers more likely to underestimate
the probability of severely adverse events that will inevitably result in
default or are they more likely to underestimate the probability of
moderately adverse events that will leave them with enough
disposable income to repay their loans (but not enough to maintain
an acceptable standard of living)?
The likelihood of a severely adverse event depends in large part on
how much a consumer should borrow, or how much a consumer
would borrow in the absence of market failure. If the ideal level of
indebtedness is quite low or even zero, 89 severely adverse events would
be quite rare because consumers would be financially able to withstand
even long periods of unemployment without defaulting on their loans;
if one does not owe any debt, one cannot default. For example, one
might argue that the financial and emotional costs of financial distress
are so severe that consumers should never borrow an amount that
would result in default with a positive probability. However, many
economists have argued that debt can improve consumer welfare by
allowing consumers to smooth their consumption over their life cycle
and the inevitable peaks and valleys that they encounter. 90 Moreover,
while bankruptcy and default are certainly costly, they may not be

89. See, e.g., ROSSER, supra note 11, at 13 ("I cannot imagine any plausible reason why
[a large proportion of the population of England] should pay at a future time rather than at
the present .... ").
90. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 13, at 1081 ("[P]ersonal debt offers benefits to
consumers in four ways: (1) as a consumption smoothing device .... "). For a discussion of
income smoothing, see generally MILTON FRIEDMA.."l, A THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION
FUNCTION (1957); Albert Ando & Franco Modigliani, The "Life Cycle" Hypothesis of Saving:
Aggregate Implications and Tests, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 55, 66-67 (1963); Franco Modigliani &
Richard Brumberg, Utility Analysis and the Comumption Function: An Interpretation of CrossSection Data, in POST KEYNESIA.'\1 ECONOMICS 388 (Kenneth K. Kurihara ed., 1954).
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prohibitively costly. Though the consumer must pay filing fees 91 and
may feel compelled to hire a lawyer to guide her through the process,
competition between routinized "bankruptcy mills" puts downward
pressure on attorney's fees. Though a bankruptcy or a default may
damage a consumer's credit rating, consumer bankruptcy scholars
provide anecdotal evidence that bankrupt consumers are able to
reenter the credit market soon after their filing. 92 Though consumers
may continue to suffer some shame or stigma following default, we no
longer live in a world in which the bankrupt debtor is made to endure
punishments that "savoured of nursery wit." 93 In any case, the debate
over the most efficient level of consumer debt has gone on for
centuries and is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.
If we assume that the socially optimal level of debt is sufficient to
cause consumers to default some of the time, how do we determine
whether consumers are more likely to underestimate severely adverse
events, or more likely to underestimate moderately adverse events?
Unfortunately the psychological research does not provide a
definitive answer. Some empirical psychology literature suggests that
overoptimism leads to overborrowing,94 but this research looks only
at overoptimism that causes consumers to overestimate their average
income or underestimate the time that it will take to repay their
debts. 95 To capture an underestimation of severely adverse events, a

91. As of November 1, 2003, the total fee for filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy was $200,
$155 of which is the filing fee. STEPHEN ELIAS ET AL., HOW TO FILE FOR CHAPTER 7
BANKRUPTCY, at 3/2 (lOth ed. 2002). See also United States Bankruptcy Court, Statutory
Filing Fees and Miscellaneous Fees, http://www.innb.uscourts.gov/pdfs/increase.pdf (last
modified Apr. 29, 2002).
92. See Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make Their Own Informed
Choices-A Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 165, 165
( 1997) ("Frequently, if the debtor had chosen Chapter 7 bankruptcy, he would be on his way
to re-establishing credit within a year or two of the case being discharged." (quoting David M.
Howe, How Can Debtors Be Motivated to Complete 100% Chapter 13 Plans, CHAPTER 13
TRUSTEE MESSENGER, S. DIST. OF OHIO, E. DIV., Feb. 1996, at 1 (publication from the office
of Chapter 13 Trustee Frank M. Pees); Braucher, supra note 72, at 538 ("Many lawyers said
that it is common for debtors to obtain credit within a year or two of a chapter 7 filing ....
Car loans and credit cards can often be obtained quickly after filing a chapter 7 case .... ").
93. See Garrard Glenn, Essentials of Bankruptcy: Prevention of Fraud, and Control of
Debtor, 23 VA. L. REv. 373, 387 (1937).
94. See, e.g., Hamish G.W. Seaward & Simon Kemp, Optimism Bias and Student Debt,
29 N.Z. J. PSYCHOL. 17, 18 (2000) (finding that students who owed more debt tended to
have higher estimates of their own income and the income of the average student ten years
after graduation and lower estimates of the time that it would take to repay their debt).
95. ld.
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study would need to ask consumers to estimate the chance that they
would suffer some hardship that would prevent them from repaying
their debts at all.
The large number of heuristics found in the literature
demonstrates that plausible arguments exist to support both the
underestimation of severely adverse events and the underestimation
of moderately adverse events. For example, the availability heuristic
suggests that people tend to overestimate the likelihood of events
that are readily called to mind or available. 96 This causes individuals
to overestimate the likelihood of particularly vivid adverse events,
such as airplane crashes, and to underestimate the likelihood of harm
from other activities such as obesity or smoking. 97 If one believes
severely adverse events are generally vivid and that moderately
adverse events are not, one may believe that consumers are more
likely to underestimate the likelihood of moderately adverse events.
However, to quality as a severely adverse event, the harm need only
be sufficient to cause a consumer with a reasonable amount of debt
to default. Many events, such as an extended period of
unemployment, almost surely quality as severely adverse events and
yet do not seem particularly vivid.
The literature also contains arguments that suggest that
consumers are more likely to underestimate severely adverse events.
For example, one common argument is that individuals tend to
completely ignore events that occur with a probability falling below
some threshold level. 98 Moderately adverse events may occur far
more frequently than severely adverse events, and it is possible that
only the probability of severely adverse events falls below the
threshold level and thus is completely ignored.
Unfortunately, the consumer bankruptcy literature does not
resolve these matters either because one can again find support for
both the underestimation of moderately adverse events and the
96. See, eg., Sunstein, supra note 14, at 5.
97. See, eg., Robert Eisner & Robert H. Strotz, Flight Inmrance and the Theory of
Choice, 69 J. POL. ECON. 355, 365 (1961).
98. See Paul Slovic et al., Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance
Implications, 44 J. RISK & INS. 237, 254 (1977) ("[P]eople may refuse to worry about losses
whose probability is below some threshold. Probabilities below the threshold are treated as
though they were zero."). See also Wesley A. Magar et al., Risk-Dollar Tradeoffs, Risk
Perceptions, and Consumer Behavior, in LEAR.l\!ING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER Al\!D WORKER
RESPONSES TO HAZARD iNFORMATION 83, 90-93 (W. Kip Viscusi & Wesley A. Magat eds.,
1987).
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underestimation of severely adverse events. Consumer bankruptcy
scholars suggest that many bankrupt consumers have suffered some
adverse event that would not have resulted in default had the
consumer borrowed only a reasonable amount; 99 by definition these
consumers have suffered a moderately adverse event. However, these
same scholars suggest that a great many consumers file for
bankruptcy because they have suffered some crushing event that
makes even reasonable repayment impossible; 100 by definition these
consumers have suffered a severely adverse event.
If one believes that consumers are more likely to underestimate
moderately adverse events than severely adverse events, however, one
might also expect that more consumers in bankruptcy would have
suffered moderately adverse events than severely adverse events. 101
This belief is somewhat inconsistent with the standard argument in
the bankruptcy literature that society cannot reasonably expect
consumers in bankruptcy to make any repayment to their general
creditors 102 because, by definition, consumers who have suffered only
a moderately adverse event are able to repay at least the reasonable
amount of debt that they should have borrowed.

D. Implications for Bankruptcy Policy
If consumers borrow too much, the government may wish to
take steps to discourage borrowing; if consumers borrow too little,
the government may wish to take steps to encourage borrowing.
Because the government may affect the level of borrowing by

99. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 16, at 1080-81 (suggesting that many consumers arrive
in bankruptcy because they have borrowed too much to allow them to survive setbacks that
would not bankrupt less indebted individuals).
100. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLNAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & ]AY LAWRENCE
WESTBROOK, As WE FORGNE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY k'\10 CONSUMER CREDIT IN
AMERICA 333 (1989) (noting that nearly half of the consumers surveyed suffered a large
income shock within the two years prior to filing for bankruptcy); Elizabeth Warren, What is a
Women's Issue? Bankmptcy, Commercial Law, and Other Gender-Neutral Topics, 25 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 24-26 (2002) (noting that nearly 40% of bankruptcy filings in 1999 were
filed by divorced or single women, and that most of these involved a serious interruption in
income; nearly half cited serious medical problems).
101. However, consumers may underestimate moderately adverse events that do not
cause them to default on their loans.
102. See supra note 100 and accompanying text; Warren, supra note 16, at 1100 (citing
an unpublished study which concluded that only a very small proportion of Chapter 7 debtors
are able to make any substantial repayment).
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changing the terms of debt relief (either inside or outside of
bankruptcy), this Article has important implications for how
generous debt relief should be. However, this Article does not
question the need for some laws that provide debt relief. Consumers
may fail to purchase insurance against risks they underestimate, and
the government can improve consumer welfare by providing or
requiring this insurance. Of course, the government need not use
debt relief to provide this insurance. The U.S. government can, and
does, provide at least limited insurance against many of the risks that
lead to financial distress such as unemployment (unemployment
insurance) and illness (Medicare and Medicaid); other nations
provide a much stronger social safety net against these risks. 103 If the
government fully insured the consumer against these risks, the
consumer's overoptimism would have no effect because these events
would never impact the consumer's financial well-being.
Insurance programs rarely provide full insurance against a loss,
however, either because they are imperfect or because the insurer is
concerned that such full insurance will reduce the consumer's
incentive to avoid the loss. For example, unemployment insurance
typically replaces about half of the consumer's lost earnings, 104 and
even if a health insurance program covers all of the consumer's
medical bills, it may not cover incidental costs and expenses such as
time lost at work. To the extent that the consumer underestimates
these risks and default is impossible, the conventional wisdom holds
true and the consumer will borrow too much because she will
underestimate the cost of repaying.
The government may try to limit borrowing directly either
through usury laws or otherwise. However, society may wish to use a
system of debt relief to discourage borrowing for two reasons. First,
scholars have long suspected that the market is able to find ways
around even draconian credit limitations such as usury limits. 105
Second, even if these credit limits are effective, they require relatively

103. See, eg., SULLNAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 11, at 257-61 (comparing
the European and American social safety nets).
104. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.16, at 416 (2d ed. 1999)
("States usually set weekly benefit amounts as 1/23, 1/24, 1/25, or 1/26 of the earnings
obtained by applicants during the relevant calendar quarters, resulting in benefit amounts
ranging from fifty to fifty-six percent of average weekly earnings.").
105. See generally Richard L. Peterson, Usury Laws and Conmmer Credit: A Note, 38 J.
FIN. 1299 (1983).
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heavy- handed government intervention, and scholars have long
argued that it is better to place the decision to extend credit in the
hands of creditors. 106 By shifting some of the risk of financial distress
to the creditors, these scholars hope to encourage the creditors to
monitor the consumer's borrowing. 107
It is unclear how much monitoring takes place in practice,
however. For example, Professor Jackson suggests that lenders might
use covenants to limit the consumer's total borrowing or activities
that could generate tort liability. 108 However, although common in
the corporate world such covenants are virtually unknown in the
world of consumer finance. Moreover, generations of scholars have
argued that consumer lenders provide very little monitoring at the
time of lending because the credit reports and other information that
creditors rely on are inadequate. 109 One is left with the distinct
impression that a consumer can always get more credit, though this
credit will come at a higher and higher price. If denied a personal
loan, the consumer can get a credit card advance. If denied a credit
card advance, the consumer can get a payday loan.
Even if lenders do not deny credit outright, the increased price
of credit may deter some consumers from borrowing. Debt relief
makes credit more expensive by requiring the credit contract to
include an insurance policy that protects the consumer against
various risks that may lead to financial distress. Because the consumer
underestimates the risks that this insurance policy insures against, she
underestimates its value, and an increased level of debt relief will
cause her to perceive the credit contract to be more expensive and
thus, to borrow less. For example, assume that there is a five percent
chance that a consumer will default on a $1,000 unsecured loan. 110 If
the consumer ignores the chance that she may default, she ignores

106. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 5, at 1424-26.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1426.
109. See, e.g., SULLlVA.N, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 11, at 246 (discussing
large amounts of credit card solicitations and the scant information on which such solicitations
are issued); Countryman, supra note 24, at 2-7 (describing what Professor Countryman
believes to be an inaccurate method of gauging a consumer's ability to repay a loan).
110. The charge-off rate (or the percentage of a bank's loans that it decides are unlikely
to be repaid and therefore removes from its books) for credit card loans issued by commercial
banks in the first quarter of 2003 was approximately 5.58%. See Charge-Off Rates, All Banks,
NSA, http:/ jwww.federalreserve.gov/releasesjchargeoff/chg_all_nsa.txt (last visited Oct. 13,
2003).

159

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2004

the $50 of debt relief that she will receive and perceives the loan
package as less valuable than it really is. In other words, the
consumer borrows too little because she underestimates the
likelihood of a severely adverse event that could force her to default
on her loans and rely on the available debt-relief system.
The benefits of shifting the risk of loss to a contracting party
better able to estimate the loss are similar to the standard result in
the products liabdity literature that holds that if consumers
misperceive the risks associated with the use of a product, the
manufacturer of that product should be held strictly liable for the
harms that result from the use of the product. l l l For example,
assume that in a competitive market a pair of roller skates would cost
$100. In addition, assume that there is a 5% chance that a consumer
will suffer a $1,000 injury while skating, 112 but that the law would
not hold the seller liable. The true expected cost to the consumer
from buying the skates and skating is therefore $150: $100 for the
skates, and $50 for the expected injury.
If a consumer overestimates the risk of skating-if she believes
that the risk is 1 0%-she will perceive the total cost from skating to
be $200, and if the happiness she would derive from skating is just
$175 she will fail to buy the skates even though it would be efficient
for her to do so. If she underestimates the risk-if she believes it to
be zero-she will estimate the cost of skating to be $100 and will
buy the skates even if the happiness that she derives from skating is
less than the true $150 cost. Now assume that the seller is held liable
for the injury. The seller will raise the price of the skates by $50 to
reflect the expected liability and the consumer will not care about the
risk of injury because she is fully compensated. Because the risk of
skating is now reflected in the price, she will purchase the skates if,
and only if, she receives at least $150 of happiness from skating and
it is efficient for her to do so.
However, the products liability model provides only an imperfect
analogy for the study of debt relief. Generous debt relief does not
make the consumer's estimation of the risk of an adverse event
irrelevant because debt relief is not narrowly tailored to insure the
consumer against the harms created by the lender's product, the

111. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAYELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 53-56 ( 1987).
112. Assume that this $1,000 represents her pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss from the
injury.
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loan. That is, when analyzing who should bear the risk of loss,
bankruptcy scholars often speak of the risk of bankruptcy or the risk
of default. 113 Yet, the actual bankruptcy filing or default is a choice
made by the consumer, and is not the underlying exogenous shock
that created the hardship. Rather, the risks central to the analysis of
debtor-creditor law are those risks that lead the consumer to default
or file for bankruptcy, risks such as unemployment, divorce or
illness. 114 If the consumer does not buy the roller skates, she cannot
suffer the injury that products liability insures her against. Even if the
consumer does not borrow any money, however, she still may lose
her job. As a result, a consumer's subjective estimation of
probabilities of loss remains relevant, but to analyze the impact of
the consumer's beliefs, one needs to be more precise than merely
alleging that the consumer is overly optimistic.
In short, a consumer's overoptimism may cause her to borrow
either too little or too much, depending on the nature of the
misfortunes that she underestimates. If this overoptimism causes the
consumer to borrow too much, generous debt relief may discourage
overborrowing by making credit appear expensive. However, if
overoptimism causes the consumer to borrow too little, society may
wish to make debt relief less generous than it otherwise would so
that the consumer will borrow more.

V. CONCLUSION
Scholars have argued for centuries that the government must
regulate the credit market in order to protect consumers from their
own ignorance. Economists have generally received this reasoning
with hostility, often noting the lack of a specific model of consumer
behavior that is preferable to the standard economic assumption of
consumer rationality. In recent decades, some scholars have accepted
this challenge by positing more specific forms of cognitive failure.
One popular hypothesis to emerge from this literature is that
consumers employ various heuristics that lead them to systematic

113. See, e.g., Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Conmmer Bankruptcy, 48
ST. L.J. 1047, 1063-68 (1987) (analyzing consumer bankruptcy as an allocation of the
risk of default).
114. See, e.g., SULLNAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 11, at 243-52 (describing
hardships that lead consumers into bankruptcy).
OHIO
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overoptimism. Bankruptcy scholars have embraced this overoptimism
hypothesis in an effort to support their calls for generous debt relief.
This Article has demonstrated that claims of systematic
overoptimism are still not sufficiently defined to allow for meaningful
policy analysis, at least in the area of consumer finance.
Overoptimism does justifY some mandatory debt relief, but the more
critical question is whether overoptimism requires the government to
adopt generous debt relief. If the consumer's overoptimism causes
her to underestimate the likelihood of moderately adverse events that
would not have led to default had she borrowed the efficient
amount, this overoptimism may lead to overborrowing, and the
government may improve her welfare by adopting more generous
debt relief or otherwise discouraging borrowing. 115 However, if her
overoptimism leads her to underestimate the likelihood of severely
adverse events that would have led to default even if she had
borrowed the efficient amount, this overoptimism will lead to
underborrowing, and the government may actually improve her
welfare by adopting less generous debt relief or otherwise
encouraging borrowing. Perhaps the relative importance of these
two forms of overoptimism can be resolved as an empirical matter.
Such an answer must come from further study, since neither the
behavioral economics literature nor the consumer bankruptcy
literature suggests a strong preference for one form of overoptimism
over the other. Until such answers are forthcoming, normative
arguments for generous debt relief should rely on other forms of
market failure.

115. See supra discussion accompanying Figures 2A and 2B.
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APPENDIX

A. The General Model 116
The verbal-analytic argument presented in the body of this
Article assumes a highly stylized form of debt relief. This Appendix
presents a model that allows for a more general analysis. Imagine a
two-period world in which a single consumer borrows some
endogenously determined amount, B, in the first period, and
promises to repay some amount, R, in the second. The consumer
has no money in the first period, and in the second period she will
have some uncertain amount of wealth, w, with which to repay this
loan; w is distributed f(w) between Wmin and Wmax· Assume that
lenders are risk neutral and that the consumer is risk averse in that
her per period utility is given by the strictly concave function, U(CJ,
where Ci denotes the consumer's consumption in period i. The
consumer discounts future values at a rate 0.
Society has enacted a system of debt relief that allows a
defaulting debtor to retain some amount of wealth, D(g, w), for her
own consumption, where g is some measure of the generosity of the
debt relief such that for all w, dD(g, w)/dg>O. The consumer's
second-period wealth never reduces her consumption after default,
but never increases her consumption by more than one dollar either,
J>dD(g, w)/dg>O. A central assumption of this Article is that a
debtor's consumption after default will not vary with the amount of
debt she has incurred, dD(g, w)/dB-0, while this assumption may
appear controversial, Section II demonstrates that it is largely
consistent with American debtor-creditor law. Assume further that
the consumer defaults whenever she can increase her consumption
by doing so, whenever w-R<D(w, g)--or whenever w<wv where
Wv is defined as wv=:D(wv, g)+R(B, g). Finally, assume that the
lender must pay some transaction costs, T, whenever the debtor
defaults.m

116. This section of the Appendix corresponds to Figure 3A and ro notes 77-80 and the
accompanying text.
117. Because the lender is risk neutral and the consumer is risk averse, the optimal
contract would fully insure the consumer by providing her the same consumption regardless of
the realization of w. Because a debt contract specifies a fixed repayment, the debtor must
always default in order ro achieve this insurance. This assumption of transaction costs,
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Assume that the consumer has all of the bargaining power in that
she is able to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a lender.u 8 All
lenders have some other opportunity so that they also discount
future values at a rate 0. Therefore, the consumer need only propose
loans that give an equivalent expected rate of return, or loans that
satisfy Equation l. Equation 1 implicitly defines R as a function of
the amount borrowed and the generosity of debt relief, or R(B, g)
where, for a given level of debt relief, an increase in borrowing will
increase the promised repayment that the lender demands (dR{B,
g)/dB>O), and for a given level of borrowing, an increase in the
generosity of debt relief will increase the promised repayment that
the lender demands (dR(B, g)/dg>O).
Equation 1:

B = J(

f

Rf(w)dw +

f

(w-D(g,w)- T}f(w)dw)

w=w.
mm

The consumer takes the system of debt relief as given and will
choose the level of borrowing that solves the following
unconstrained maximization problem:
Equation 2:
wmax

Max{B):U (B)+ J(

f

U(w- R(B,g)f(w))dw+

f

U(D(w,g))f(w)dw)

w=w.
mm

Assuming, for now, that there are no market failures, and
excluding possible corner solutions such as an optimal level of
borrowing equal to zero, the optimal level of borrowing, B*, is
defined by the consumer's first order condition:

borrowed from the cosdy state verification literature, assures that the consumer and lender will
choose a contract that will require the consumer to repay her debts in full for at least some
realizations of w. See generally Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, Incentive-Compatible Debt
Contracts: 1be One-Period Problem, 52 REv. ECON. STUD. 647 (1985).
118. The results of this Article do not depend on the lack of market power.
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Equation 3:

U'(B*)=8

wf U'(w-R(B*,g))f(w)dwdR~;,g)
w=wv(g,B*)

In other words, the consumer borrows until the marginal utility
of consumption in the first period equals the expected cost of
repayment, in terms of lost utility, in the second period. Note,
however, that she will only make this repayment when her wealth is
sufficiently large that she will not default, that is, when w>wv(B*,
g). Finally, note that because the consumer takes the existing system
of debt relief as given, Equation 3 defines the optimal level of
borrowing as a function of the generosity of debt relief. Therefore,
one can solve for the optimal level of debt relief, g*, by choosing the
level of generosity that maximizes the consumer's utility. Assuming
the consumer cannot purchase insurance from a third party, g*>O
because the lender is risk neutral and the consumer is risk averse.

B. Underborrowin§ 19
Now assume that the consumer is excessively optimistic in that
she underestimates the likelihood of severely adverse events, events
that would cause her to default even if she borrowed the efficient
amount, B*. Specifically, assume that the consumer erroneously
believes that her second-period wealth is distributed s(w) where
s(w)<f(w) for w<wv(B*, g) and s(w)>f(w) for all w?>wv(B*,

g).l20

Assume that the lender still knows the true distribution of wand
that the consumer learns how the amount of borrowing affects the
required repayment by consulting a schedule provided by the
lender. 121 The consumer will now borrow an amount B/' that
solves:

119. This section of the Appendix corresponds to Figure 3B and to Part N.A.
120. This assumption is made to isolate the effects of underestimating severely adverse
events.
121. A rational consumer could infer the correct distribution of w from this schedule, but
the overoptimism hypothesis presumes an irrational consumer. In effect, the consumer assumes
that the lender is overestimating the probability of an adverse event occurring.
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Equation 4:

U'(B:) = J(

wl , U'(w-R(B;,g))s(w)dw dR~i,g))
w=wD(g,B,)

Equation 4 is identical to Equation 3 except that the consumer's
overly optimistic estimation of the distribution of second-period
wealth, s(w), replaces the correct distribution, f(w). For any level of
borrowing, the right-hand side of Equation 4 (when the consumer is
overly optimistic) is greater than the right-hand side of Equation 3
(when the consumer knows the true distribution), and thus the
consumer will borrow less, not more, as each dollar borrowed yields
less and less utility in the first period (B*>B/'). The right-hand
side of Equation 4 is greater than the right-hand side of Equation 3
because we have assumed that s(w)>f(w) for all w>wD(B*, g).
This means that the consumer overestimates the probability that she
must repay her debt and thus overestimates the dollar value of her
expected repayment.

C. Overborrowin§ 22
Now assume that the consumer underestimates the likelihood of
more moderately adverse events that leave her with w>wD(B*, g)
but does not underestimate the probability of severely adverse
events. Specifically, assume that for all w<wD(B*, g), m(w)-f(w),
and that there is some arbitrary point, Z>wD(B*, g), such that for
all wD(B*, g)<w<Z, m(w)<f(w), and for all w>Z, m(w)>f(w).
The individual will borrow an amount BM" that solves:
Equation 5:

U'(B~)=b"(wf U'(w-R(B~,g))rr(w)dwdR(~,g) +
w=Z

J. U'(w-R(B~,g))rr(w)dwdR(~,g))
"""'o(g,BM)

Equation 5 is identical to Equations 3 and 4 except that the
consumer now assumes a distribution of m(w), and we have
artificially split the maximization in two parts to highlight the effect

122. This section of the Appendix corresponds to Figure 3C and to Part IV.B.
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of the under- and overestimation. The right-hand side of Equation 5
is now less than the right-hand side of Equation 3, meaning the
consumer will keep borrowing beyond B* until her marginal utility
of borrowing equals this lesser amount, BMA>B*. Because the
consumer underestimates only moderately adverse events, she
correctly estimates the probability of repayment at B* and thus does
not underestimate the expected value of the amount that she must
repay. However, she thinks that it is disproportionately likely that she
will be asked to repay when she is wealthy and her marginal utility of
consumption is low. This matches the common intuition that overly
optimistic consumers underestimate the probability that they will
suffer some event that will make repayment difficult and painful, and
thus overborrow.
Note that if one takes an expansive view of overoptimism and
assumes that consumers underestimate the likelihood of severely
adverse events (events that leave the consumer with w<wn(B*, g))
as well as moderately adverse events (events that leave the consumer
with wn(B*, g)<w<Z), the results become theoretically
ambiguous. The underestimation of severely adverse events will
cause underborrowing. The underestimation of moderately adverse
events will cause overborrowing. Which effect will dominate is an
empirical matter that will depend on the precise nature of the
overoptimism, the degree of the consumer's risk aversion, and the
debt-relief laws that society has adopted.

D. Addressing a Technical Complication
The above analysis assumes the amount of the consumer's debts
have no effect on her consumption after default. Although this
assumption allows for the exploration of the basic intuition behind
the results of this Article, it appears that, at least in some
jurisdictions, some consumers may receive more generous debt relief
(a Chapter 7 discharge) than others solely because they have
borrowed more and are thus less able to repay their debts. 123
The possibility that debtors may increase their consumption after
default by increasing their level of borrowing provides yet one more
reason why overoptimism may not lead to overborrowing. To
simplifY the analysis, assume that a court will deny all relief to a

123. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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consumer if it feels that the consumer does not have enough debt to
warrant relief; if the consumer is denied relief she will repay her debt
in full. A consumer will still default if and only if her wealth falls
below some critical amount, w<wD(B, g), but now she may be
better off if her wealth is slightly below this value than if her wealth
is slightly above this level. Mathematically, U(wD(B, g)-R(B,
g))<U(D(wD, g)). Because of this, the consumer's first order
condition must now be written as:
Equation 3a:
U'(B)

=

wf

U'(w-R(B,g))f(w)dwdRc;;g) +

w=w0 (B,g)

The new term is negative and represents the chance that a
marginal increase in debt could allow the debtor to receive fairly
generous debt relief rather than be forced by the courts to repay her
debt in full. Of course, the first term will include an offsetting effect
(embedded in dR(B, g)/dB)) because the lender will charge the
debtor for this possibility. However, we need not worry about the
precise nature of dR(B, g)/dB because we assume that it is the
same regardless of the degree of the consumer's excess optimism.
If the adverse events that the debtor underestimates include
those that are just severe enough to result in default if the debtor
incurs the amount of debt that she is considering, then this
underestimation may cause the consumer to borrow less than the
ideal amount. That is, if the consumer is considering an additional
amount of debt, and underestimates the likelihood that this
additional amount of debt will result in a default that will actually
increase her consumption, then she will undervalue this second
(negative) term, and she will believe that the right- hand side of
Equation 3a is larger than it really is. As a consequence, she will
borrow less so that the marginal utility of consumption in the first
period is greater.
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